Introduction
Environmental issues are key concerns for governments and organizations worldwide, largely as a result of deteriorating climatic conditions. Global warming, ozone layer depletion, waste, and increasing pollution levels create problems all over the world, and a general belief is that most of the problems are a result of poorly regulated manufacturing activities (Shukla et al., 2009; King and Lenox, 2001) . Increasing global demand and industrialization causes land, water, and air pollution, and degrades natural resources (Huong, 1999) . Accordingly, manufacturing firms face pressures from stakeholders, including end customers who prefer to buy eco-friendly products, along with a growing number of legal regulations that establish environmental standards for products, such as the Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment Directive and the Restriction of Hazardous Substance Directive (Hu and Hsu, 2010; Shukla et al., 2009) .
These regulations and emergent market pressures have prompted some organizations to seek ways to reduce their environmental impact and develop green products. Moreover, companies are starting to recognize environmental performance as a source of competitive advantage (Wagner, 2005) . New initiatives in operations and manufacturing -such as eco-design, design for the environment, design for recyclability, green supply chains, reverse logistics, product stewardship, and product take-back efforts -expand the responsibility of the firm to the post-consumption period. Because industrial products are a major source of environmental problems, responsible manufacturers must take environmental impact throughout the entire life cycle of a product into consideration, rather than focusing solely on environmental pollution during the manufacture of products. This holistic approach can help minimize resource consumption, reduce waste, and possibly eliminate environmental pollutants. The firm extends its environmental responsibility beyond its own boundaries and tries to reduce sources of waste and pollution throughout the supply chain (Canning and Hanmer-Lloyd, 2001 ). Design centered on the environment thus integrates environmental aspects or considerations, such as product recyclability and reusability, into product design, with the goal of considering the complete product life cycle of a product or process (Sarkis, 1998) .
These initiatives are relatively well established in developed countries; however, they continue to lag in developing countries (Gonzales et al., 2010; Shukla et al., 2009) . Recycling, reuse, and remanufacture efforts in developing countries are still considered a byproduct of waste and end-of-pipe activities rather than strategic options and elements of change for product design. However, such initiatives could be highly significant for developing countries in general and Asian countries in particular, because recent studies have shown that the majority of world's manufacturing will be carried out in Asia in coming decades (US-AEP, 1999) . Concomitant with the lack of actual practice, we lack quantitative research about eco-design and performance improvement, especially in Asia (Zhu and Liu, 2010) . Green supply chain research needs to move away from anecdotal studies and adopt theoretically grounded and empirical frameworks (Holt and Ghobadian, 2009 ).
This study examines link among external institutional drivers, internal proactive environmental strategies, and environmental performance. Drawing on institutional theory, we explain how drivers of eco-design affect environmental performance. The model we propose includes direct and indirect effects and provides a more rational depiction of environmental performance. We thus make two primary contributions. IJOPM 32, 6 First, by studying the mediating role of eco-design, we seek to extend knowledge about its role in terms of effective green supply chain strategies. Second, we analyze the influence of external drivers (government regulation and incentive, customer pressure) on eco-design, because we posit that they are core enablers of eco-design and environmental performance.
In the following sections, we present a theoretical background and literature review and develop our hypotheses. Next, we outline the methodology and results, followed by a discussion. Finally, we provide our conclusions and managerial implications.
Theoretical background and literature review
The concept of internal proactive environmental strategy: eco-design A proactive environmental strategy reflects an evolutionary environmental strategy that applies early compliance to attain pollution-prevention results (Menguc et al., 2010) . A proactive environmental strategy aims to minimize emissions, effluents, and waste and therefore focuses on well-defined environmental objectives to prevent pollution rather than expensive "end-pipe" capital investments to control it. Hart (1995) demonstrates that proactive environmental strategies provide firms with a competitive advantage, and eco-design represents the most efficient tool to implement a proactive environmental strategy.
Eco-design, also called design for the environment or green design, refers to the identification of environmental aspects of a product over its entire life cycle and the integration of these aspects into product development. As an internally focused type of green supply chain initiative, eco-design requires the firm to improve the environmental attributes of its products internally, with little cooperation or interaction with external parties such as suppliers and customers. Therefore, eco-design differs from externally oriented green supply chain initiatives, such as green purchasing. The aim is to minimize a product's environmental impact over its whole life cycle -from acquiring materials to manufacturing and use and ultimately to its final disposal -without compromising other essential product criteria, such as function, cost, performance, quality, or legal and technical aspects (Johansson, 2002) . Thus, eco-design integrates environmental aspects into the product design process, taking into consideration the entire flow of the product in its supply chain. This consideration is very important, because most environmental impact arising from the production, consumption, and disposal of the product are direct consequences of decisions made in the design stage (Handfield et al., 2001) .
The design stage defines the function of the product, process, or service and selects the raw materials, supplies, and process chemicals to be used. These choices in turn determine the energy consumed to create products and the waste generated. In addition, the durability, serviceability, and energy consumption of products during their lifetime can be determined (WBCSD, 2006) . Specific eco-design actions or activities vary across companies and products, but basic eco-design activities include:
. design for reduction, or the elimination of environmentally hazardous materials such as lead, mercury, chromium, and cadmium (Zsidisin and Siferd, 2001) ;
. design for reuse, which facilitates the reuse of a product or part of it, with no or minimal treatment of the used product (Sarkis, 1998) ;
. design for recycling, which facilitates disassembly of the waste product, separation of parts according to material, and reprocessing of the material (Lin et al., 2001);  Environmental performance
. design for remanufacturing, or repair, rework, and refurbishment activities that attempt to return the product to new or better-than-new condition (Beamon, 1999) ; and . design for resource efficiency, which reduces consumption of materials and energy during product use, in addition to promotion of the use of renewable resources and energy (APO, 2004) .
The eco-design process usually starts with a lifecycle assessment (LCA), a tool used to evaluate the environmental impact of a product over its entire life (Zutshi and Sohal, 2004) . That is, LCA assesses the environmental burden created by a product from "cradle to grave," including material selection, production, distribution, packaging, consumption, and disposal (Lin et al., 2001; Sarkis, 1998) . Such assessments calculate the consumption of resources and production of waste and pollution, along with other environmental and social impact, at each stage of the product life cycle (Gauthier, 2005) . The result of this calculation is an "impact evaluation matrix," which quantifies the various environmental impact over various stages (Hagelaar et al., 2004) . The matrix offers a technique for gathering information about the environmental burdens of processes at specific points in the supply chain (Hagelaar et al., 2004) . It also helps decision makers identify problems in their supply chains to help them make appropriate decisions to reduce these problems. Eco-design thus offers a systematic method for firms to reduce the environmental impact of their products and processes while simultaneously reduces costs and increases product marketability (Hu and Hsu, 2010) . By reducing the adverse environmental impact of a product across its raw material acquisition, manufacturing, distribution, use, and disposal, eco-design addresses environmental problems resulting from both the production and consumption of a product. In contrast, a conventional product design view focuses solely on quality, cost, ergonomics, and safety.
In summary, eco-design establishes guidelines for design engineers pertaining to the environmental safety and soundness of a product. The impact of the product's entire life cycle is evaluated according to various aspects, such as alternative options for reducing waste and energy, recycling, or the elimination of product waste during manufacturing.
Institutional theory
Institutional theory suggests that in the quest for legitimacy and social fitness, firms adopt homogeneous, institutionalized (rule-like) structures and practices that reflect the mandates of the institutional environment or field in which they operate (Oliver, 1997; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977) . Legitimacy is "a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions" (Suchman, 1995, p. 574) . Institutional theory in turn specifies three mechanisms through which the influence of institutional environments transfers to organizations (Scott, 2001; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) :
(1) coercive isomorphism resulting from pressures exerted by other organizations on which the firm depends, which may be felt as force, persuasion, or an invitation to join in collusion; (2) as established by social organizations, professional associations, or academic institutions; and (3) cultural-cognitive isomorphism that results from the firm's rational desire to imitate the behavior of other organizations because of its perception that the imitated behavior is legitimate or has technical value. Riverta et al. (2006, p. 197 ) also conclude that "literature on voluntary environmental programs shows a growing consensus consistent with institutional theory that gives external pressures a significant role in determining the adoption of these initiatives." Similarly Delmas and Toffel (2004) , Delmas (2002) and Jennings and Zandbergen (1995) find that institutional theory provides a plausible explanation for the occurrence and diffusion of green strategies and routines.
External institutional drivers of eco-design
The drivers of eco-design are the motivators that encourage business organizations to adopt eco-design. According to institutional theory, two primary mechanisms influence the behavior of organizations: imposition and inducement (Scott, 1987) . These mechanisms are enacted through regulatory institutions and other organizations that constrain the organization and direct its behavior (Oliver, 1991) . When enacted as laws, the constraints force firms to make necessary changes in their structure and processes because they would avoid the potential costs, uncertainty, and legal liabilities for noncompliance (Clemens and Douglas, 2006; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) . Alternatively, an agency can provide incentives to organizations to induce them to act in a desirable manner (Grewal and Dharwadkar, 2002) . Accordingly, we consider two major drivers of eco-design: regulation and incentive and customer pressure.
Hypotheses development

Conceptual framework
To guide our subsequent discussion, we show our key constructs in Figure 1 . On the basis of our literature review, we propose that the drivers of eco-design and eco-design itself contribute differently to environmental performance. Using an institutional theory perspective, we argue that institutional antecedents associated with governmental Relationship between regulation and incentive, and customer pressure Stakeholder theory focuses on the interests of stakeholders (government, investors, political groups, customers, suppliers, communities, trade associations, and employees) and assumes that organizations perform to satisfy the benefits and interests of these stakeholders (Delmas, 2002) . Regulation and incentive (REG&INC), and customer pressure (CUSTPRE) represent the interests of stakeholders and exert coercive isomorphism in the sense that they use rules, laws, and persuasion to encourage compliance. Specifically, regulation and incentive are coercive mechanisms that exert both impositions and inducements on organizations (Scott, 2001) , and they reflect the standards of regulatory agencies both inside and outside the country. Accordingly, we define regulation and incentive operationally as legislation, standards, and rules that include imposition and inducement elements, set by the government, parent companies, foreign governments, or international organizations that can influence manufacturing organizations to adopt green supply chain initiatives. Customer pressure also represents coercive mechanisms that exert impositions or inducements on firms to adopt green supply chain initiatives, but these impositions and inducements take the form of customer demands or directions to set environmental standards, the provision of incentives and encouragements to adopt green supply chain initiatives, and customer rejection of products that contain hazardous elements or insufficient recyclable or usable contents. If we consider an organization's institutional environment as composed of all stakeholder groups with an interest in a particular issue, greater integration and involvement by these stakeholder groups should grant them more power to influence the firm's environmental strategies. Maxwell et al. (1998) argue that customer pressures affect regulation and incentive on environmental issues. They propose that individual customers must be aware of the implications of pollution control on their well-being, and of the efficacy of various feasible policy remedies. Individual customers of similar interests must coordinate on a mutual strategy to gain political influence. Conversely, Clark and Lee (2004) show that regulation and incentive are effective tools for complementing existing environmental protection policies, especially when they are used to increase customers' environmental awareness. The literature shows that there is a correlation between these two external institutional drivers. That is, regulation and incentive may provide information to educate customers to increase their awareness of environmental concerns. On the other hand, customer pressure may also influence regulatory policy through lobbying group, or even news media. This particular phenomenon cannot be explained by causality. Hence, we propose that regulation/incentive and customer pressure are positively correlated:
H1. Regulation and incentive are positively correlated with customer pressure.
Effect of regulation and incentive on eco-design
Organizations may adopt eco-design (ECODESN) in response to environmental regulation and incentive set by regulatory institutions such as government bodies inside the country, standards established by other firms (mainly export companies), and directives IJOPM 32,6 by parent companies. Such regulation and incentive take the form of formal rules, laws, sanctions, and incentives (Ravi et al., 2005; Preuss, 2001) . In general, two types of regulatory mechanisms exist to motivate business firms to undertake environmental initiatives or avoid harmful impact. The first requires industries to monitor hazardous wastes and submit environmental impact assessment reports for any new projects or new plants (Abdullah, 1995) . Most governments also offer various environmental incentives to the manufacturing sector such as capital rebates for purchasing recycling machinery and exemptions on import duties and sales tax for such machines or the provision of pioneer status (which earns tax exemptions) and tax allowances to companies that ensure the proper storage, treatment, and disposal of toxic and hazardous waste, waste recycling activities, and conservation of energy (Holt and Ghobadian, 2009 ).
Yet no government regulations or incentives directly require businesses to undertake eco-design, even if they might stimulate green supply chain initiatives indirectly. For example, incentives that encourage recycling and waste reduction may motivate companies to design recyclable products and increase the recyclable contents in their products. In addition, firms may respond to regulations set by other countries. Many countries, especially in Europe, have strict regulations that prohibit hazardous products and promote recycling and product take-back (Tibben-Lembke, 2002; Ferguson and Browne, 2001 ). These regulation and incentive have significant effects, especially for firms that export products to these countries. Parent companies also may set rules and standards that oblige subsidiary companies, including those in developing countries, to adopt certain green initiatives. Therefore, we posit:
H2. Regulation and incentive positively affect the use of eco-design.
Effect of customer pressure on eco-design Customers, as major financial stakeholders, can exert considerable pressures and may communicate goals of sustainability or environmental performance to suppliers (Rao, 2006; . Anbumozhi and Kanda (2005) recognize that customer pressure and expectations for green products provide effective means to extend environmental practices in Asia. They also noted that many companies in Asia supply parts or products to big multinational corporations based in Japan, the USA, and Europe, so pressure from these large buyers may be the most effective way to improve the environmental performance of Asian companies.
Prominent examples include Ford Motor's requirement that all its suppliers achieve the ISO 14001 standard and the statements of environmental responsibility for Toyota, BMW, and Mitsubishi, which include supplier activities (Young and Kielkiewicz-Young, 2001 ). Recently, 11 major international corporations indicated they would start monitoring the carbon emissions of smaller companies that supply them as an effective strategy to tackle global warming (INA, 2008) . Such pressures should encourage companies to behave in more environmentally conscious manners to keep their customers. Thus, we propose:
H3. Customer pressure positively affects the use of eco-design.
Drivers of eco-design and environmental performance
We focus on drivers that emanate from the external environment of an organization: regulation and incentive, and customer pressure. Both are legitimacy-based activities Environmental performance that exert institutional pressure. With such institutional pressures associated with environmental issues, a firm's desire to enhance its environmental performance (ENVPERF) may provide a boundary condition for the effectiveness of economic performance. That is, institutional theory suggests that when there is institutional pressure from various stakeholders, improved environmental legitimacy can be observed by stakeholders. Hence, we posit that responding to institutional pressures and considering the public's perception of the firm and its reputation affect the firm's overall environmental performance. As we hypothesize, when there is greater institutional pressure from stakeholders such as the government and consumers, the firm's environmental performance should improve:
H4. Regulation and incentive positively affect environmental performance outcome.
H5. Customer pressure positively affects environmental performance outcome.
Eco-design and environmental performance Environmental performance implies positive results for the natural environment, such as the reduction of solid/liquid wastes, reduction of emissions, resource reductions, decrease of consumption of hazardous/harmful/toxic materials, decrease of frequency of environmental accidents, and increase in compliance with environmental standards (Geyer and Jackson, 2004; Zhu and Sarkis, 2004) . Strategic choice theory holds that a firm's strategies drive its performance, and firms choose a specific strategy if its rewards outweigh the costs. Thus, strategies determine performance. Starik and Marcus (2000) also find strategic choice theory especially relevant in the environmental field. Firms' environmental strategies are inherently complicated, due to the number, complexity, and jurisdictional issues associated with environmental regulation and incentive, as well as the number, complexity, diversity, and importance of stakeholders. Strategic choice theory therefore might explain managers' attempts to apply a rational framework in such a disorganized environment. If a green strategy produces sufficient resource slack, environmental performance will follow. Prior literature supports the idea that eco-design induces positive environmental performance. For example, Geyer and Jackson (2004) identify the environmental benefits of green supply chains, including the diversion of products from landfills and the replacement of primary with secondary resources in the reverse supply chain, which mitigates the environmental burdens of production. Zhu and Sarkis (2004) , in their analysis of data from the Chinese manufacturing sector, also find significant positive relationships between eco-design and environmental performance:
H6. Eco-design positively affects environmental performance outcome.
Methodology
Sampling procedure A sampling frame encompasses a list of all elements in a population (Sekaran, 2003) . The sampling frame for this study is the environmental management system (EMS) ISO 14001 -certified manufacturing firms in Malaysia; the unit of analysis is the individual firm. The term "firm" therefore refers to companies or individual units or sites within companies. We chose ISO 14001 -certified firms because they are more likely to have adopted green supply chain initiatives (Darnall et al., 2008; Zhu et al., 2008; Sroufe, 2003) . Darnall et al. (2008) find higher green supply chain IJOPM 32,6
initiatives adoption rates for EMS adopters. The high level of awareness and experience with environmental issues generated by the adoption of EMS facilitated the adoption of green supply chain initiatives. Sroufe (2003) also find a strong positive relationship between EMS adoption and environmental design, recycling, and waste practices. Finally, Zhu et al. (2008) show a strong positive relationship between ISO 14001 certification and the adoption of green supply chain initiatives in Chinese firms. They explain their results in terms of organizational learning: the experience with ISO 14001 generated momentum and encouraged the adoption of green supply chain initiatives. One of our study informants supported this notion in the Malaysian context by noting that "once a company becomes certified, it tries to put certain requirements to their suppliers regarding green activities." For this research, the sampling frame represents all ISO 14001 -certified firms in Malaysia, which we obtained from the Standards and Industrial Research Institute of Malaysia (SIRIM) and the Federation of Malaysian Manufacturers (FMM, 2007) directory of Malaysian manufacturers. SIRIM is the largest government-sponsored certifying firm in Malaysia. It has certified hundreds of firms, including those that have earned the environment management system (EMS) ISO 14000 certification; thus, SIRIM has extensive experience and knowledge of green practices in Malaysia. A SIRIM representative, in an interview, provided a list of all firms certified by that organization prior to 2007. The total number on that list is 396, and the total number of ISO 14001 -certified companies in the FMM directory is 261. The discrepancy between SIRIM and FMM lists occurs because the SIRIM list includes all firms certified by SIRIM, whereas the FMM list includes firms certified by other certifying bodies as well. Moreover, the FMM list features only firms that voluntarily provided their certification information to FMM, which excludes some certified firms that did not provide such information. After combining the two lists and removing duplicate records, our sampling frame consists of 569 firms.
Survey instrument
We developed the variable measures on the basis of our literature review and interviews. We interviewed practitioners from firms that have implemented some form of green supply chain initiatives to discover and clarify emergent phenomena in their practices and indicate appropriate constructs and explanations, which suggest some key constructs and associated relationships. With the help of SIRIM, we conducted a series of interviews with environmentally conscious firms in March 2007. The interviews took about 2 h each and were recorded with the consent of the interviewees. At the end of this phase, we transcribed the recordings in preparation for subsequent analysis. To date, very few large-scale studies have been conducted in the area of eco-design, its drivers, or environmental outcome (Vachon and Klassen, 2006) . Therefore, few reliable and validated measures are available, and this research includes both the few available measures and newly constructed items. We pre-tested the questionnaire for content validity and reliability. Academics familiar with green supply chain survey study assessed the face validity of each indicator in terms of its readability, clarity, and general adequacy for representing the concepts. Then we distributed the questionnaire to 16 randomly selected EMRs of certified manufacturing firms who provided feedback about the items and general structure of the questionnaire. To assess the coercive mechanisms that induce organizations to perform specific practices, we developed seven items that reflect elements of regulation and incentive. Some items are newly constructed, and the others are adaptations of measures from Zhu et al. (2007) , Darnall (2006) and . For the coercive mechanisms that exert impositions or inducements on firms to adopt green supply chain initiatives, we use items that reflect the elements of customer pressure, both newly constructed and adapted from Darnall (2006) , and Carter and Ellram (1998) . We employ a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
Eco-design is the environmentally conscious design of a product and its packaging to minimize the adverse environmental impact throughout its entire life and promote positive environmental practices. The measurement items, adapted from Sarkis (1998) and Zhu et al. (2007) , rely on a five-point Likert scale, with endpoints of 1 (not at all) to 5 (very high extent).
The environmental outcome represents the actual impact of green supply chain initiatives, such as compliance with environmental standards, reduced air emissions, decreased resource consumption, and lower consumption of hazardous materials. Specific items come from Zhu et al. (2007) and Rao (2002) . Respondents indicate the environmental performance outcome on a five-point Likert scale (1 -"strongly disagree," 5 -"strongly agree"), according to the achievements in the past three years as a result of their green supply chain initiatives. The Appendix contains the details of the survey instrument.
Respondents' profile
The initial sampling frame of the study is the 569 ISO 14001 certified firms. Since two firms were used for the interviews and 16 firms were involved in the pilot study, the revised questionnaires were sent to the remaining 551 firms. After two reminder letters in addition to telephone calls and e-mails, 132 usable questionnaires were received. The response rate is about 24 percent. All subsequent analyses are based on these 132 responses. We present the characteristics of the responding firms in Table I . About half (51.5 percent) of the firms belong to the electrical and electronics industry, the largest industry in Malaysia. The remaining respondents are distributed among the chemicals, rubber and plastics, and metal and machinery industries. Newly established firms are relatively rare in the sample (24.2 percent); most firms (75.8 percent) are well established (more than 15 years). Similarly, most firms are large (more than 250 employees; about 70 percent), which is consistent with the ownership status data that show that multinational corporations account for roughly 70 percent of the firms. Firms that are fully Malaysian-owned account for 30 percent.
Regarding the types of product, more than half (57.6 percent) of the firms produce industrial products, and the rest produce consumer products. Most firms (75.8 percent) have more than ten suppliers, which indicate their large supplier base. For the average relationship length with major suppliers and customers, our data reveal that more than IJOPM 32,6 90 percent of firms maintain long-term relationships (more than five years) with their suppliers and customers. This finding provides evidence of the widespread relationship orientation in Malaysian industry. With regard to the sources of inputs, Table I shows that approximately half of the firms (49.2 percent) obtain inputs from global sources, and the rest obtain them from domestic and regional sources. Finally, more than half of the firms (54.5 percent) participate in industry, trade, or professional associations that have interest in green issues.
Statistical analysis Measurement model
We used the two-step structural equation modeling (SEM) approach using LISREL 8.72 to estimate the measurement and structural models separately to assess the psychometric properties of the scale items for each construct and to establish relationships between the exogenous and endogenous variables (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988) .
The first measurement model tested was the regulation and incentive construct. Following the suggestions of Byrne (1998) (2010) explain that firms adopt green supply chain initiatives and set internal environmental standards by following the guidelines established by legislations, we allowed the errors of a firm's green supply chain initiatives (A1) and its environmental standards (A2) to correlate. Also, Setthasakko (2009) shows that cost is the most significant obstacle to the adoption of green initiatives. Financial incentives offered by the Malaysian Government (A4) and other international organizations (A5) are major motivators that help to offset the huge cost of implementing green initiatives. Thus, we allowed these two error terms to covariate. The second measurement model tested was the customer pressure construct. We correlated the error terms between the two indicators, customers' green requirements (B1) and their threat to withhold contracts for noncompliance (B2) because it is the prerogative of the customers to do so if suppliers fail to meet their environmental standards (ElTayeb et al., 2010) . Next, we assessed the eco-design construct. Zutshi and Sohal (2004) and Lin et al. (2001) reveal that the eco-design process begins with a LCA to evaluate the environmental impact of a product over its lifespan, including its material selection, distribution, packaging, consumption, and disposal. Thus, we correlated the errors between the use of recycled materials (C1) and LCA (C2), as well as between ensuring the use of recyclable materials in its packaging (C5) and reusable packaging (C6). Also, since using reusable packaging reduces material and energy consumption, we correlated the error terms between the two indicators, making products that reduce material consumption (C4) and ensuing packaging is reusable (C6). Finally, the error terms of the overall environmental performance indicator (D1) and the improvement in compliance to environmental standards indicator (D2) were correlated because the latter is a subset of the overall performance (Zhu and Sarkis, 2004) . For example, increased compliance with environmental standards such as reduction of solid waste, pollutants, and consumption of hazardous materials directly improve a firm's overall environmental performance. Figure 2 and Table II contain the results of our measurement models. Table II shows that the Cronbach's a statistics for the constructs suggest the scales are sufficiently reliable, with 0.802 for regulation and incentive, 0.895 for customer pressure, 0.932 for eco-design, and 0.887 for environmental performance. Critics of Cronbach's a argue that it is a simple measure of reliability based on internal consistency that fails to estimate errors caused by factors external to an instrument, such as differences in testing situations or respondents over time. For SEM, composite reliability (CR) and average variance extracted (AVE) offer viable alternatives, because they are more parsimonious than Cronbach's a. Thus, in Table II we provide the CR values, which range from 0.899 to 0.964, in excess of the recommended threshold value of 0.60. The AVE values range from 0.604 to 0.816, which exceed the suggested threshold level of 0.50. These statistics show that the constructs are reliable. Consistent with the two-step modeling approach, we ran a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) by testing all the four measurement models concurrently. The CFA exhibits excellent model fit (x 2 /df ¼ 1.50, NFI ¼ 0.91, NNFI ¼ 0.95, CFI ¼ 0.96, IFI ¼ 0.96).
Construct validity tests
The LISREL results support our proposed model. The x 2 /df statistics is 1.304, and the measurement models reveal discriminant, convergent, and nomological validity. IJOPM 32,6 Table III shows the descriptive statistics and correlations of the four constructs. A preferred structural equation model approach to assess discriminant validity of measurement models is the x 2 difference test between the constrained model and the unconstrained model of each pair of the constructs (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988) . For example, to test the discriminant validity of the two constructs, REG&INC and ECODESN, the constrained model sets the correlation between the two constructs to one which results in a x 2 -value of 122.95 with 60 degrees of freedom ( p , 0.05). Next, the unconstrained model allows the correlation between the two constructs to be freely estimated, which yields a x 2 -value of 101.59 with 59 degrees of freedom ( p , 0.05). The statistically significant x 2 difference test between the constrained and unconstrained models (x 2 diff, df ¼ 1 ¼ 21.36, p , 0.05) indicates that the two constructs, regulation and incentive, and eco-design, show discriminant validity. Table IV summarizes the x 2 difference tests, confirming discriminant validity of the four constructs.
In terms of convergent validity, we find large and significant standardized loadings of each measured item on its construct as shown in Figure 2 ( Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1993) . We assess nomological validity by determining the root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA), confirmatory fit index (CFI), incremental fit index (IFI), and normed fit index (NFI). The model fit indices (RMSEA ¼ 0.048, NFI ¼ 0.92, CFI ¼ 0.97, IFI ¼ 0.97) show that the model fit is acceptable, so the final structural equation model adequately reproduces the population covariance matrices (Steiger, 1990) .
Results
In Figure 3 , we provide the path parameter estimates for our proposed model. The correlation between regulation and incentive and customer pressure is statistically significant (b ¼ 0.14) at a ¼ 10 percent, in support of H1. The paths from regulation and incentive to eco-design (b ¼ 0.58), and from customer pressure to eco-design (b ¼ 0.23) are statistically significant at a ¼ 5 percent, so H2 and H3 are supported. The path from regulation and incentive to environmental performance (b ¼ 0.26) is also statistically significant, in support of H4. However, there is a lack of statistical Environmental performance evidence to support H5. Finally, the path from eco-design to environmental performance (b ¼ 0.21) is also significant, in support of H6. Among regulation and incentive, eco-design, and environmental performance (H2, H4, and H6), we discover partial mediation, such that the significant path relationships among the three constructs demonstrate regulation and incentive have both direct and indirect effects on environmental performance, the latter through eco-design. Hence, only part of the total effect of regulation and incentive on environmental performance is due to mediation through eco-design.
Customer pressure has no direct effects on environmental performance (H5), but we confirm the direct effect on eco-design (H3). Also, it has an indirect effect on environmental performance (H6) through eco-design, which indicates a complete mediating model among customer pressure, eco-design, and environmental performance, where customer pressure is the antecedent, eco-design is the mediator, and performance is the consequence. The indirect effect of customer pressure on performance through eco-design shows that customer pressure does not affect environmental performance directly, but via eco-design.
Regulation and incentive affect eco-design (b ¼ 0.58) and environmental performance (b ¼ 0.26) suggesting that it affects a firm environmental performance directly and indirectly via eco-design. The results support a partially mediated relationship among regulation and incentive, eco-design, and environmental performance.
Discussion
An interesting observation of this research is the statistically significant correlation between the regulation and incentive construct and the customer pressure construct. Policy makers and government agencies often institute new environmental regulations, laws, and incentives in response to issues raise by environmental organizations, and to protect the environment and the consumers. Similarly, manufacturers typically respond to the same group of organizations to fulfill the demand of the consumers, to comply with legislations, and take advantage of any financial incentives. Thus, it is not surprising that regulation and incentive, and customer pressure are statistically correlated.
The significant effect of customer pressure on eco-design is consistent with the findings of Sroufe et al. (2000) and Walker and Sisto (2008) . Our respondents are suppliers of big firms overseas, and these large customers exert significant pressures on their suppliers to ensure they comply with strict environmental product standards. Multinational companies try to ensure that all products in their supply chain meet all environmental requirements in Europe, Japan, or the USA. The firms respond to such customer pressure to avoid losing their customers. They remain concerned about their long-term survival, in terms of earning consistent contracts and maintaining good relationships with customers that provide business opportunities.
Because eco-design is an internally focused green supply chain initiative, the firm tries to improve the environmental attributes of its products and processes internally with little cooperation or interaction with external business entities. Therefore, the impact of such an improvement links directly to the internal performance of the firm. For example, Zhu et al. (2007) find a significant effect of internal environmental management on economic performance but no effect of externally oriented green supply chain initiatives (e.g. green purchasing, customer cooperation). Both regulation and incentive, and customer pressure represent coercive pressures; the only difference is the source of that pressure. IJOPM 32, 6 For regulations, the pressure comes from government and other regulatory bodies, whereas for customer pressure, it is exerted by direct customers of the firm.
We cannot confirm that customer pressure affects environmental performance (b ¼ 0.00) directly, which is not surprising. Prior research has suggested that the positive impact of customer pressure is attributable to infrastructural decisions made as part of broader compliance with governmental regulation and incentive. However, our analysis shows that customer pressure influences environmental performance indirectly through eco-design. The coefficients of the path from customer pressure to eco-design and from eco-design to environmental performance are 0.23 and 0.21, respectively. This finding may help explain why in some cases, customer pressure fails to enhance firm environmental performance. Figure 4 synthesizes the results and managerial implications of this study. Policy makers and firms attempting to nurture their eco-design should not overlook the important role of environmental regulation and incentive. However, new regulation and incentive for eco-design are emerging that may require specialized knowledge and expertise, as well as significant capital investment and a willingness to assume risk. Also, product life cycles are shrinking rapidly and global competition is escalating the availability of competing product offerings simultaneously. These factors have made it extremely difficult for firms to implement eco-design to products and processes on their own in a timely, viable manner. However, the statistically significant path from the regulation and incentive construct to eco-design hints that the threat of noncompliance with legislations and financial incentives from government agencies and international organizations play a crucial role in encouraging eco-design that emphasizes the use of recycled and recyclable materials in the product and its packaging, LCA, and encourages companies to produce energy conscious products, among others. Policy makers and government agencies should realize that their proactive role in formulating relevant environmental standards and legislations has a profound impact on the eco-design of the products and processes of manufacturing firms. Government agencies and policymakers should also develop cooperative relationships with environmentally conscious manufacturers to educate and encourage them to implement effective eco-design. The indicators in the regulation and incentive construct suggest that a "carrot and stick" approach is preferred over a "carrot on a stick" tactic. Environmental performance
Managerial implications
Although our study shows that customer pressure has no direct significant impact on environmental performance outcome, savvy managers of downstream manufacturing firms should continue to exert pressure and encourage key suppliers to adopt green supply chain management. The rationale is that customer pressure affects the eco-design of strategic suppliers, which ultimately impact environmental performance outcome. This is especially important because regulation and incentive, and customer pressure must be considered simultaneously due to the positive correlation between them. It is through the simultaneous consideration of regulation and incentive, and customer pressure that the greatest effect on eco-design is achieved. A successful eco-design that stresses the use of recycled and recyclable raw materials in the products and their packages, LCA, and the design of products and packages that minimize waste and energy consumption will in due course improve environmental performance.
Another key implication of this study is that policy makers should not underestimate the role of regulation and incentive in improving environmental outcome. Without the proper guidelines, regulations, and financial incentives, few companies are likely to initiate green supply chain management, especially in the developing countries. Relying solely on customer pressure in isolation of regulation and incentive is unlike to achieve the desired environmental performance outcome. Regulation and incentive affect environmental performance outcome directly, and also via eco-design. Indeed, the direct impact (b ¼ 0.26) on the performance outcome is larger than the effect of eco-design (b ¼ 0.21). Thus, policy makers should exploit the "carrot and stick" approach to induce manufacturing firms in developing countries to adopt green supply chain management.
Conclusions
This study examined the drivers of eco-design and their impact on environmental performance. The results provide empirical support for the central thesis of this study. That is, eco-design mediates the impact of regulation and incentive, and customer pressure on environmental performance. We provide support for the institutional theory as it relates to environmental sustainability. Eco-design allows firms to react to regulation and incentive, and customer pressure by leveraging their inimitable core competency and expertise for green designs. With the proper regulation and incentive, firms can achieve environmental performance levels in excess of those that they might achieve by their own voluntary efforts to protect the environment. This study helps managers to understand the value of their internally developed eco-design capability to respond to external pressures and institutional concerns. The response to external institutional pressures provides a basis for creating an inimitable eco-design resource base, which is critical to environmental sustainability. The results show that eco-design is a key factor to sustainable environmental performance, and our study provides further evidence of the influence of external institutional pressures and internal eco-design on environmental performance.
Limitations and future studies
This research is not without limitations. First, our attempt to offer a theoretical green supply chain management framework is ambitious and creates some inherent limitations. The most noteworthy limitation of this study is the range of developed constructs for eco-design characteristics. Our research design incorporates multiple rounds of theory building through literature reviews and expert opinions, but it does not IJOPM 32,6 capture every aspect of the complex concept of eco-design characteristics. Establishing a valid, reliable instrument to capture the multiple facets of eco-design is an ongoing process, and no psychometric technique can achieve an absolutely complete measurement. Therefore, it is possible that other dimensions of eco-design that influences a firm's environmental performance are not captured herein. Similarly, there are other stakeholder pressures and issues being excluded from the regulation and incentive, and customer pressure constructs. Future studies should collect data from different countries to validate our findings and results to provide a thorough understanding of the eco-design construct and its antecedents and consequences.
Second, this study uses subjective measures as indicators of performance outcome, which may not be able to subsume the achievement of strategic objectives and exploitation of competitive advantages. Moreover, some successful green-oriented enterprises may fail to achieve profitability. Other financial ratio measures therefore could add richness to the measure of environmental performance outcome. However, financial ratios derived from accounting data represent short-term performance measures, whereas subjective measures commonly reveal long-term performance. Future research should examine the effect of eco-design on firm performance using both financial ratios and subjective measures.
Third, longitudinal data would have been useful to determine whether the effect of the variables is short-term or enduring. Longitudinal data might indicate how changes in certain variables affect environmental performance outcome. A revised model that uses changes in antecedents (e.g. regulation and incentive, customer pressure, and eco-design) and changes in consequence (e.g. environmental performance outcome) may yield better results, because a dynamic formulation eliminates the influence of variables whose levels remain comparatively stable (e.g. it takes time to develop eco-design). Also, a lagged relationship between changes over time helps clarify the causation in the model. Fourth, though theory lends support to the generalizability of our results, there may be significant differences caused by the homogeneous nature of the sample gathered from one country. If researchers use a more heterogeneous sample, they may face more variance noise, which could result in less explained variance. Manufacturing firms in different countries (e.g. Western countries) may face different institutional pressures. Future study should examine manufacturing firms in different countries to compare whether they benefit from different levels of eco-design, and how regulation and incentive, and customer pressure affects environmental performance outcome.
